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Abstract In this paper, I examine the ethics of e-trust and
e-trustworthiness in the context of health care, looking at
direct computer-patient interfaces (DCPIs), information
systems that provide medical information, diagnosis,
advice, consenting and/or treatment directly to patients
without clinicians as intermediaries. Designers, manufac-
turers and deployers of such systems have an ethical
obligation to provide evidence of their trustworthiness to
users. My argument for this claim is based on evidentialism
about trust and trustworthiness: the idea that trust should be
based on sound evidence of trustworthiness. Evidence of
trustworthiness is a broader notion than one might suppose,
including not just information about the risks and perfor-
mance of the system, but also interactional and context-
based information. I suggest some sources of evidence in
this broader sense that make it plausible that designers,
manufacturers and deployers of DCPIs can provide evi-
dence to users that is cognitively simple, easy to commu-
nicate, yet rationally connected with actual trustworthiness.
Keywords Direct computer-patient interfaces  e-trust 
e-trustworthiness  e-health  Ethics of biomedical
engineering  Evidentialism  Health care ethics 
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Introduction
In this paper I use notions of e-trust and e-trustworthiness
to make an ethical argument about the design of informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) in health care.
As I define it, trust is an attitude of willingness to rely on
another person or entity to perform actions that benefit or
protect oneself or one’s interests in a given sphere of
activity, together with a normative expectation: the person
or entity should perform in a particular way. In e-trust the
thing trusted is an ICT system consisting of computers,
networks and operators. Trustworthiness is the counterpart
of trust, a characteristic of a trusted person or entity such
that it is likely to perform as expected and that it meets the
normative expectations of trust. E-trustworthiness is this
characteristic as applied to ICT systems. In what follows,
I assume that technological artifacts and systems can be
proper objects of trust. I explain and defend this view
elsewhere (Nickel 2012).1 I will freely use the terms trust
and trustworthiness to refer to e-trust and e-trustworthiness
in what follows.
I look particularly at direct computer-patient interfaces
(DCPIs for short), computer systems which diagnose,
advise and even treat patients directly by means of ICT.
Direct computer-patient interfaces collect patient data,
draw inferences from that data, and deliver information
back to the patient on the basis of these inferences,
assisting or replacing the function that a physician usually
performs. For example, online health websites that take
information from patients and deliver diagnoses or
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recommendations for physician consultation are a form of
DCPIs.2 Direct computer-patient interfaces can also oper-
ate within and under the supervision of a clinical facility.
More complex DCPIs have other features such as linkage
with imaging or diagnostic equipment or biological test
results, expert (human) review of the results, artificial
intelligence (e.g., revision of inferential algorithms in light
of new data), integration with medical records systems, etc.
Direct computer-patient interfaces differ from telemedi-
cine, in which ICT is used as a medium for medical care, in
that DCPIs take over some of the intellectual tasks of the
physician. Direct computer-patient interfaces are also more
than mere health information sources, because they gather
information about patients and respond on the basis of that
information.
In what follows, I argue that the designers, makers and
deployers of DCPIs have an ethical obligation to provide
sound evidence to patients of these systems’ trustworthi-
ness. There are some reasons for initial skepticism about
this claim. First, it is natural to assume that the main
obligation a designer or manufacturer has regarding the
trustworthiness of its products is to make the products
themselves reliable, since a reliably functioning product is
the defining goal of designers’ and manufacturers’ activity.
In a discussion of hip replacement system design, for
example, John Fielder argues that engineers’ primary
obligation is to make safe, well-functioning products. He
also argues for a secondary, positive communication-ori-
ented obligation: in case there are any known defects, use
restrictions, or unsafe aspects of the product, the engineer
is required to disclose these fully and promptly (Fielder
1992, discussed in Vallero 2007). But no mention is made
of the need to communicate additional sound trust-related
information to physicians or patients in cases where the
products are reliable or where it is not known that they are
unreliable. Similarly, a recent discussion of implantable
heart transplants focuses on establishing standards for
device reliability and disclosure of faults in medical devi-
ces, rather than on providing evidence for trust (Myerburg
et al. 2006). One might reasonably suppose that DCPIs are
similar to these other health devices: design of a reliable
product and disclosure of any known faults or defects
demarcate the limit of manufacturer obligations.
Moreover, positive ethical obligations are usually more
difficult to justify than negative ones. (By ‘positive ethical
obligations’, I refer to obligations most naturally expressed
by describing what must be done, rather than what is for-
bidden and must be avoided.) Judy Thomson (1971), for
example, famously argues that the positive obligation of
laypersons to provide life-saving assistance to others does
not hold in cases where it is inconvenient to do so. Positive
obligations take up valuable resources. One should be wary
of introducing new obligations that impose burdens of
action on already busy, morally engaged people.
Despite these considerations, I argue that some kinds of
products must also be accompanied by genuine evidence of
their trustworthiness. Direct computer-patient interfaces are
an especially interesting case for three main reasons. First,
there is widespread consensus concerning the ethical values
that apply to medical professionals in their treatment of
patients. It is widely agreed that medical professionals have
a positive obligation to respect the autonomy of their
patients (the Principle of Autonomy), to obtain patients’
informed consent for medical procedures (Informed Con-
sent), and always to act for the sake of their patients’ benefit
(Beneficence) (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). What
would be optional, supererogatory or only ‘‘imperfectly’’
obligatory actions for ordinary people, such as making
substantial time sacrifices for the sake of another person’s
health, are strictly or perfectly morally obligatory for doc-
tors and considered part of their role obligations. Although
the interpretation of Autonomy and Beneficence is some-
times disputed and conflicts between them sometimes dif-
ficult to resolve, the principles themselves are widely
accepted and standardly taught in medical school curricula.
Consensus is also emerging that trust is a central value of
the clinician-patient relationship (ibid., pp. 40–41).
Second, ICT permeates the practice of health care,
making it unclear how the standard medical ethics frame-
work ought to be adapted to situations in which computers
mediate or replace relationships between clinicians and
patients. People seeking information about health care,
including sick people, often turn to the Internet for infor-
mation (Uden-Kraan et al. 2009). Health care facilities test
systems that allow patients to respond to Internet-based
questionnaires about their health and receive tailored
therapeutic feedback (Mangunkusumo et al. 2005). Intel-
ligent computers can also interact with patients to obtain
informed consent to therapies (Dunn et al. 2001; Anony-
mous 2009) and in principle even administer these thera-
pies (Selmi et al. 1991; Bobylev et al. 1997). In the future,
it is not unrealistic to suppose that many or all of these
functions could be integrated into a single interface. How
should we adapt medical ethics and the conception of
trustworthiness to these developments?
Third, the use of DCPIs in particular brings the possi-
bility of significant benefits and risks. On the one hand, the
resource of clinicians’ time is a crucial bottleneck in the
availability of health care. Computers can make health care
more widely available and cheaper, spending more time on
communication with patients and doing so in more com-
fortable and convenient times and places. But on the other
hand, there can also be serious risks associated with DCPIs.
2 An example is EasyDiagnosis at http://easydiagnosis.com Accessed
26 January 2011.
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This can be seen by drawing a comparison with the risk
scenarios that experts have identified in telemedicine, a
technology with many functional similarities to DCPIs
(Stanberry 2001; Duplaga and Zielinski 2006). Patients
entrust confidential information to these systems, such as
information about symptoms and identifying personal
information. Confidential diagnostic data can also be gen-
erated by these systems. Moreover, patients may base
crucial medical and non-medical decisions on the diagnosis
and advice they receive from such systems. Furthermore,
patients may sometimes perceive these systems as
replacements for traditional medical consultation and avoid
seeking further medical help.
Although others have brought the notion of trust to bear
on ethical issues in health care (O’Neill 2002; Illingworth
2005), these attempts can be improved upon in two
philosophical respects. First, the account of what trust is
can be sharpened so as to serve as a plausible shared
starting point for ethical arguments, making it easier to
identify where trust can be found or how it can be stimu-
lated or discouraged.3 Second, it can be made clearer why
and under what circumstances trust is epistemically and
ethically justified and when it is demanded or made salient
by the circumstances.
Evidentialism about trust
I frame my argument with an elementary conceptual dis-
tinction. Theorists of trust such as Russell Hardin (2006)
have noted that trustworthiness and trust are different
(though related) concepts. Trustworthiness is the property
of a person (or in the broader sense used here, an artifact or
system) such that its performance can be relied upon, and
such that it meets the normative expectations of potential
trustors. Trust, on the other hand, is an attitude taken by
people toward that entity, of willingness to rely on it.
Whereas trustworthiness is possessed by the object of trust,
trust is possessed by the person who trusts.
With this distinction in place I can now state the first of
three propositions to be defended in what follows, that trust
should be based primarily on evidence of trustworthiness
(what I call evidentialism about trust). Evidentialism is a
view in the traditional philosophical debate about the
‘‘ethics of belief’’ holding that one’s belief states should
conform to the available evidence.4 Evidentialism about
trust holds that trust should be based on evidence that the
trusted entity will perform as anticipated and meet the
trustor’s normative expectations. It contrasts with prag-
matism, the view that other kinds of reasons (such as
considerations of desirable consequences) are appropriate
basic reasons for trust. In the realm of health care, a
pragmatist might hold that patients should trust whenever
doing so is good for their health or for the optimal (fair,
profitable, etc.) functioning of the health care system, or
perhaps whenever they have no other good option. These
claims conflict with evidentialism.
I offer two main philosophical arguments in favor of
evidentialism about trust. The first is an adaptation of a
familiar style of argument called the ‘‘wrong kind of rea-
son’’ argument. As Pamela Hieronymi (2005) explains the
point, reasons are considerations that bear on a question.
Different kinds of questions require different kinds of
considerations to answer them. For example, we must
distinguish between the question ‘‘Is it true that P?’’ and
‘‘Would it be good to have the belief that P?’’ (for example,
‘‘Is it true that I will survive the surgery?’’ vs. ‘‘Would it be
good to believe that I will survive the surgery?’’) Some
kinds of considerations that bear on the second question do
not bear on the first question: e.g., ‘‘If I believe that I will
survive the surgery I will make my family happy’’ or ‘‘It is
painful to think about the surgery.’’ If these are reasons at
all, they are reasons for or against having a certain mental
state, not reasons that bear on the probability that I will
survive the surgery. Hence they provide the wrong kind of
reason for answering the question to which that mental
state intrinsically responds. Hieronymi holds that the atti-
tude of trust is formed directly in response to the question,
‘‘Is S trustworthy?’’ Considerations about whether it would
be good to have the attitude of trust do not all directly bear
on this question (Hieronymi 2008). For example, if trusting
a computer program would please the programmers, that
might be a pragmatic reason to have the attitude of trust,
but it would not make the program any more trustworthy
and therefore would be the wrong kind of reason for trust.
The second argument is based on a minimal rationalist
principle of morality, the Recognition Requirement (Nickel
2001). This requirement states that a decision is morally
good only to the extent that one decides from a recognition
of relevant reasons. Take an example of a medical decision
made on somebody else’s behalf: suppose Betty is
unconscious and Al, her designated proxy, must decide
whether to elect a particular surgery as a treatment for her.
Al should decide based on reasons such as Betty’s pref-
erences and the risks and benefits of the surgery. Suppose
3 For example, Beauchamp and Childress’s discussion is based on a
definition of trust as ‘‘a confident belief in and reliance on the moral
character and competence of another person …’’ and according to
which trustworthiness is a moral virtue (op. cit, p. 41). This contrasts
markedly with social scientific conceptions of trust, which often hold
that trust and trustworthiness are not inherently moral qualities.
4 Evidentialism about the ethics of belief is distinct from the view,
also sometimes called evidentialism, that justification can be analyzed
in terms of the evidence available to the subject. See Conee and
Feldman (2004).
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Al makes the correct decision, but not based on the right
reasons: he flips a coin without even considering the rea-
sons for and against the surgery. In that case, his action
would not ordinarily be morally good. The important thing
to notice here is that the Recognition Requirement has an
informational aspect: in order for Al to recognize the right
reasons, he needs to have relevant information available. If
Al cannot find out what the surgery is or what Betty’s
preferences are, then he cannot make the decision on the
right basis and therefore cannot act morally well, even if by
accident he gets it right. Al can be excused for his poorly-
grounded decision in the event that relevant information is
totally unavailable, but the very fact that he must be
excused proves that something has gone wrong. So in
morally important decisions, having access to the right kind
of reasons is a precondition for acting morally well.
The Recognition Requirement thus gives Al strong
reason to be attentive to available information and seek out
relevant information that is lacking. But as I argue in the
next section, the Requirement does not only carry impli-
cations for Al. It also places an requirement on those on
whom Al might rely for Betty’s treatment. These people
are in a position to provide some of the information Al
needs in order to make a well-justified decision. In a
responsible practice of health care, professionals (whether
clinicians or engineers) will do what they can to provide Al
with information that helps him meet his own informa-
tional burden.
Relevant evidence about the trustworthiness of a DCPI
system for aspects of one’s health care consists of infor-
mation about its capacity to make true and accurate state-
ments, to protect one’s private data, to make appropriate
diagnoses, etc. One way of presenting this information is to
state the system’s track record of success in similar cases or
extensive clinical testing, in which the risks of inaccurate
diagnosis, breaches of confidentiality and so on are esti-
mated and this information presented to the patient. In
medical contexts this is the normal way of implementing the
Principle of Informed Consent. When patients are presented
with the option of surgery or other medical treatment, they
are given statistical information about the likelihood and
severity of various risks associated with the treatment. This
ensures that their decision is not arbitrary and that they take
responsibility for its moral consequences.
There is an important worry here, however, that these
normative requirements are unrealistic. Some psycholo-
gists studying human decision making have concluded that
people make inferences on the basis of inaccurate and
inconclusive evidence and that they are incapable of the
rationality implied by evidentialism (Tversky and Fox
1995; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). There are also more
specific doubts about the ability of people to make rational
inferences about the impact of good and bad events on their
well-being (Wilson and Gilbert 2003), particularly in the
health care domain (Ditto et al. 2005). This leads to the
worry that it is impossible or impractical to meet the bur-
den of evidentialism.
I have three main responses to this objection. First,
although people may be decision-theoretically irrational in
some contexts, one prevalent view in psychology is that
they nonetheless have a ‘‘bounded rationality’’ that applies
to certain contexts, enabling them to make quick, rational
decisions much of the time (Gigerenzer and Selten 2002).
Second, people with a better than average ability to make
evidence-based practical decisions about their healthcare
deserve to have good information on which to base their
trust. And finally, the concept of evidence or rationality
presupposed by those who question the ability of humans
to decide rationally is too narrow. Evidence need not be
conceived of so narrowly as only to include probabilistic
information about risk. It can also include social, interac-
tional, and contextual information. I describe some of these
sources of information in the concluding section.
The obligation to provide evidence of trustworthiness
My second main proposition is that if the designer, manu-
facturer or deployer of a DCPI elicits patient trust con-
cerning serious health matters, evidence of the system’s
trustworthiness should be made available. Weaker trust-
oriented duties have been suggested by moral philosophers
in the past. Tim Scanlon advocates a principle forbidding
the intentional creation of false expectations in a subject:
‘‘One must exercise due care not to lead others to form
reasonable but false expectations about what one will do
when one has good reason to believe that they would suffer
significant loss as a consequence’’ (1998, 300). But Scanlon
does not suggest that the trusted party has an obligation to
provide information about its trustworthiness to the subject.
Why should there be such an obligation? As hinted in the
previous section, my argument is as follows. If a morally
good action requires access to relevant reasons for that
action and if it is the case that one is well-positioned to
make such reasons available to the subject, then it seems
one has the opportunity to make morally good action pos-
sible. If one then fails to do so when given the opportunity,
other things equal, it seems one has not acted rightly. Thus it
appears that makers and deployers of DCPIs have ethical
reason, other things equal, to make evidence about trust-
worthiness available to potential users of these systems.
In other cases where a product is offered to consumers,
it is not generally assumed that they also have a duty
(rather than just prudential reasons) to provide information
about the trustworthiness of the product. This has a great
deal to do with resource constraints and cognitive
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limitations in information exchange. In practice the ability
of people to make a well-informed judgment about trust-
worthiness is limited, yet they often must trust anyway (in
the sense that for practical reasons they must rely on others
and they accept this fact voluntarily). Even for people with
multiple options, good information, and substantial
resources for investigation, it may not make sense to spend
much time reflecting on their trust because doing so is
time-consuming and competes with other resources and
priorities. Sick people in particular are beset with many
other goals and demands and are often under particular
strain because of illness. Although it may be rational for
them to spend time investigating and weighing the reli-
ability of their health care, they may have many other
priorities.5 Furthermore, their ability to process this infor-
mation may also be weakened by illness, fatigue or dis-
traction. Health problems affect people without much
regard to levels of education and informational access, so
many people have a hard time understanding health
information unless it is carefully communicated. In addi-
tion, clinicians have little time to communicate with
patients (Østbye et al. 2005). Hence patients are put in a
position to trust clinicians without having much informa-
tion about trustworthiness.
Yet there is reason to think that providers of health care
information and services have a special obligation to pro-
vide information. A distinctive fact about the ethics of
health care is that health care providers have various
positive duties to patients. It is commonly assumed that
health care providers cannot meet their ethical obligations
merely by ‘‘doing no harm’’ (National Commission 1979).
They have a positive obligation of beneficence which
motivates strict duties for health care providers to give
positive assistance. While the makers of fruit juicers or
paint primers might have only a weak obligation to provide
evidence of the trustworthiness of their products, the
makers of a DCPI technology are governed by more
stringent background obligations to provide positive
informational assistance.
Furthermore, if evidence can be made easier to under-
stand, so that it takes less patient time to evaluate and
becomes more widely accessible to those with cognitive
limitations, then some of the obstacles that might otherwise
stand in the way of meeting the obligation to provide
evidence of the trustworthiness of DCPIs will be reduced.
To some extent, DCPIs can increase the basis for trust by
giving patients more information about trustworthiness.
Because their use is not restricted by the limited resource of
physician contact time, they ease the problem of meeting
the evidentialist requirement.
There are still substantial worries about the epistemic
practicability of this obligation, however. Insofar as the
DCPI itself is used to deliver information about its trust-
worthiness, there will be a circularity problem: the validity
of the information about trustworthiness will only provide
the right kind of reason if the DCPI is already trustworthy.
Take an obvious example: if a DCPI has a ‘‘trust-page’’ on
which the patient reads that the system was developed by
the most knowledgeable experts in the field, this informa-
tion can only be as reliable as the system itself. It seems
that the patient will need independent information about
the reliability of the system in order to have reason to trust
it. There is also the problem of discerning valid health
information sources from bogus sources of health infor-
mation, designed by those with a purposeful intention to
deceive, or with the sale of bogus medical services as their
aim (‘‘informational snake-oil’’). Systems can fake the
validation of outside health authorities, illicitly linking to
legitimate websites or bypassing browser verification sys-
tems to create deceptive mirror certification sites. Some of
the sources of evidence I mention in the next section can
help address these problems.
What is good evidence of the trustworthiness of DCPIs?
In this final section, 1 discuss the nature of evidence of
trustworthiness as provided by DCPIs, offering some pre-
liminary ideas about how the obligation to provide such
evidence can be met. My remarks are intended to show that
fulfilment of the obligation is feasible, rather than to pro-
vide a detailed set of recommendations.
Evidence of trustworthiness consists of some available
sign or phenomenon that makes it more likely that a desired
performance is worth counting on and may be normatively
expected. Consider again the example of a ‘‘trust page’’ on
a DCPI website. Does the presence of this page make it
more likely that the DCPI will produce truthful information
about the patient’s condition and keep her personal infor-
mation confidential?6 The relevant general question is:
does the total evidence presented to the user of a DCPI
make it reasonable to expect it to perform and make its
performance sufficiently likely that it is worth staking one’s
actions on it relative to other salient options? In what
follows I will focus on those aspects of the total evidence
5 Evidence suggests that patients need time to absorb difficult and
emotionally fraught information, and that they go through phases in
which they do not want additional information (Leydon et al. 2000;
Case et al. 2005).
6 Some signs are bad evidence even though they have a salient
psychological impact. An early study of trust in online advice
concludes that users trust websites with a good ‘‘look and feel,’’ that
are ‘‘easy to navigate and free of errors and clutter’’ (Briggs et al.
2002, 330). But this leaves open the question whether an easily
navigated website is more likely to be trustworthy than one that isn’t.
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which are interactional (having to do with one’s interaction
with the system and its designers and especially its de-
ployers) and on those which derive from the socio-tech-
nical context of deployment of the DCPI. These are the
most helpful evidence sources for users of DCPIs and are
also most likely to overcome the epistemic problems
mentioned at the end of the previous section.7
Russell Hardin’s notion of trust as ‘‘encapsulated inter-
est’’ is a good place to start in the search for interactional
evidence about the trustworthiness of DCPIs. According to
Hardin (who is analyzing interpersonal trust rather than
e-trust), the rationality of one’s trust in another person
depends on whether one’s own interests are encapsulated in
that person’s interests. There are various reasons for
interest-encapsulation, such as the desire for future inter-
action and exchange (reciprocal dependence), the concern
of those involved for their general reputation (reputational
staking), or the fact that one will be harmed or legally
punished if one does not fulfill one’s expectations (sanction
threat) (Hardin 2006).
Reciprocal dependence is likely to be an insignificant
source of evidence about the trustworthiness of DCPIs. The
designers, manufacturers, and deployers of a DCPI are
unlikely to be dependent on the future action of any one
particular patient.8 The dependence relationship is unilat-
eral, not reciprocal in the way needed to provide additional
evidence of trustworthiness.
Reputational staking, on the other hand, is prevalent
among e-health systems and can take a number of forms. If a
DCPI is located in a clinical setting, the clinical insitution
itself stakes its reputation on the system. In web-based
e-health applications, certification often consists of a label
displayed when a user accesses a website, an ‘‘about us’’
page, or an institutional embedding of the site (Eysenbach
2000; Anonymous 2011). The visible presence of a link to a
certifying governmental agency or independent professional
organization makes it more likely that the DCPI is trust-
worthy because it ensures that the reputation of a recognized,
independent institution is staked on the reliability and secu-
rity of the software. For example, a telephone-based test for
depression is currently being offered in the Netherlands
whose website bears the logo of the VU Medical Center, a
major academic medical center.9 Through this visible sign,
the VU Medical Center incurs some responsibility for the
reliability of the test for depression. This sort of reputational
staking is widely regarded to make a difference to trustwor-
thiness (Coleman 1990; Pettit 1995).
There are significant skeptical worries about the ability
to take advantage of such evidence, however. First of all,
sometimes a whole sector is worthy of suspicion. For
example, during the recent financial crisis certain highly
dubious financial products were widely traded and regarded
as legitimate by major banks and many in academia.
Reputational staking by legitimate businesses and aca-
demic institutions did not guarantee trustworthiness. This
seems to show that even certain sound financial products
could not be trusted by non-experts because they could not
reliably be distinguished from unsound products. Since
there are comparable worries about the complicity of
academia and regulators in the certification of pharma-
ceuticals and medical procedures, one might be concerned
that no amount of reputational staking can sufficiently
support a judgment of trustworthiness in DCPIs.10 Sec-
ondly, it is difficult for many people to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate third party certifiers. And
thirdly, any certification of a DCPI will be general and will
not directly transfer to each configuration and application
of the system because the specific configuration and
application are sometimes questionable as well.
The first worry, concerning situations in which a whole
sector of activity is untrustworthy, is the most difficult of
the three to address. It is not always possible to provide
valid evidence of the trustworthiness of reliable products.
In cases where a whole sector is suspect, fundamental
measures to reduce risk and provide better governance may
be needed to reestablish and demonstrate trustworthiness,
distinguishing good from bad products. Direct computer-
patient interfaces and the e-health sector in general appear
not to be in this dire state, but the decentralized nature of
regulation in some parts of the sector may make it vul-
nerable.11 It is widely agreed that trust is difficult to rees-
tablish once it has been widely undermined (Walker 2006).
The second worry is that it is difficult for people to
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate certifiers. As a first
response, it is worth going back to the point that
7 It is important to note that the types of evidence discussed in this
section may be insufficient in situations where there is a stringent
burden to provide even more probing trust-related information to the
users of DCPIs. For example, when using experimental DCPI systems
to administer medical care, it may be necessary to explain the system,
its clinical or therapeutic function, and any possible risks of its use in
greater detail. (I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.)
Indeed, in such cases it is probably not yet reasonable to have
normative expectations about how the system should function, and so
the system itself cannot be trustworthy, even if per accidens it is
reliable and the experimental team is trustworthy.
8 For this very reason, Hardin himself confines the concept of trust to
individual relationships. Most other social theorists take a broader
view, however. See Mo¨llering (2006) for an extensive discussion.
9 http://www.nationaledepressietest.nl/, Accessed 26 January 2011.
10 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for posing these questions.
11 Eysenbach (2000) emphasizes self-regulation and consumer edu-
cation because he thinks we should accept this decentralization. With
today’s corporate consolidation of the web and greater concern for
risk control, one might instead emphasize governance measures such
as institutional oversight and embedding of services within estab-
lished clinical institutions.
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reputational staking can be combined with other means of
demonstrating trustworthiness. The question is whether the
total evidence presented to the user of a DCPI makes its
trustworthiness likely. Threat of sanctions and contextual
evidence can be combined with reputational staking, con-
tributing to a pool of total evidence that supports trust-
worthiness. Governance structures such as laws, regulatory
agencies and professional boards can be put in place to
ensure that defective or fraudulent systems are detected and
moral, institutional or legal sanctions are applied. The user,
if made aware of this, can reasonably infer that the DCPI
will comply with relevant standards. In addition, it is the-
oretically possible to certify the certifiers, iterating the
same strategy of verification at a higher level. For evi-
dential value it is best to make this as simple and concrete
as possible, for example by making it possible to call a
support person or an oversight authority with questions and
concerns. And finally, it is possible to place the DCPI
physically within a clinical context (e.g., a major public
hospital) that is clearly legitimate.
The third concern is that evidence provided by certifi-
cation and sanctions cannot ‘‘trickle down’’ to each specific
configuration and use of a DCPI. For example, users might
not know whether a general diagnostic system for depres-
sion can be used in their particular case (e.g., with a teen-
ager). General interactional evidence of trustworthiness
does not establish its trustworthiness for this use. This worry
can be addressed both theoretically and practically. First,
theoretically, although evidence of trustworthiness will
always give some false positives (systems that are untrust-
worthy despite evidence to the contrary), this does not by
itself undermine the value of evidence in establishing
trustworthiness. The threshold for adequate evidence of
trustworthiness is not so high that it must rule out every
false positive; it need only ensure that the likelihood of
unreliability is small. Users’ skeptical worries, in order to
make additional evidence necessary, must be reasonable or
well-grounded. Jonathan Adler, a well-known defender of
evidentialism in epistemology, has argued that it is not, for
example, the duty of a waiter to investigate every possible
skeptical worry before asserting that a cup of coffee is
decaffeinated, even if there are a few customers who have
arrhythmia and could suffer as a result of being served
caffeinated coffee (Adler 2002). To challenge the waiter’s
assertion, the customer must have a valid reason for ques-
tioning this claim, such as that they themselves are ar-
rhythmatic or that they believe they saw the pots of coffee
switched. The importance of Adler’s point here is that
DCPIs should be actively responsive to reasonable con-
cerns about the configuration and use of a system, but they
need not respond to every conceivable worry about the
system. This makes the burden feasible to bear. Practically,
what this means is that the deployers of such systems must
provide a meaningful mechanism for tracking the success of
the system in different implementations and for registering,
evaluating and responding to the trust-related concerns of
individual users and user groups. They should also be aware
of the threat of illegitimate web-based DCPIs that may
undermine the credibility of their systems, and they should
take specific measures to differentiate their site from these
other systems.
One of these measures, briefly referred to above, is to
exploit a different type of evidence about the trustworthi-
ness of DCPI systems: information derived from the socio-
technical context of the system. As Carusi (2009) explains,
discussing another kind of socio-technical medical system
(technology that helps radiologists distribute and compare
their interpretations of mammograms), the particular way
an ICT system is contextualized and used is crucial to
establishing trust among the system’s users. For example, a
system which allows double-blind ICT-enabled confirma-
tions of a mammogram result produces different feelings of
trust than conventional double-readings of mammograms.
Carusi points out that such contextual information is usu-
ally implicit as a reason for trust. Such implicit informa-
tion, consisting of background beliefs or perceptions, can
also serve as evidence (Adler 1990).
The socio-technical context makes a crucial difference to
the additional evidence needed to establish trust in DCPIs as
well. As mentioned above, a DCPI interaction under the
supervision of a clinician in a health care facility inherits a
great deal of evidential support from its socio-technical
embedding. Strong evidence of trustworthiness is provided
to the user by her warranted background beliefs about the
reliability and professionalism of the institution. The user
need not consider this evidence consciously in order to be
more strongly warranted in relying on the system. In addi-
tion, there is little chance that a deceptive system has been
smuggled into the facility, in the way that a bogus web-
based DCPI might be confused with a legitimate one.
Therefore, fewer skeptical concerns need to be addressed in
order to provide adequate evidence for user trust.
It also follows that, if this context is taken as given, then
it is much easier for the designers, manufacturers and de-
ployers of the system to meet their evidentiary obligations.
Indeed, they may need to do very little further to provide
evidence of trustworthiness.12 However, as e-health and
other clinical innovations such as home health care robots
change the boundaries of clinical care (Coeckelbergh
2010), it may well be worth bearing in mind that this
context change can substantially affect the user’s epistemic
situation, particularly if it is perceived as creating a new
context and thus severs the link with warranted background
12 I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for stressing the
importance of this point.
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beliefs about reliability. Contextual features must therefore
still be weighed along with other features to determine the
total evidence available to the user.
I conclude by pointing out some important practical (non-
truth-related) features of sources of evidence. In addition to
providing a valid link with the truth, evidence of trustwor-
thiness should also be cognitively simple and easy to com-
municate. A noteworthy fact about the types of evidence
explained above is that they do not rely on difficult-to-pro-
cess information about the track-record or risks associated
with the product. Thus they shift the focus away from tra-
ditional conceptions of what counts as relevant evidence for
people considering medical treatments. The model of
informed consent for surgery and other medical therapies
emphasizes information about risk. However, it is very dif-
ficult for people to process information about risk. Risk is not
cognitively simple or easy to communicate (Fuller et al.
2001; Moore 2008). This has led to the problem that the
process of informed consent to medical therapies has mainly
a legal or institutional value (protecting the hospital from
liability) rather than helping to satisfy the ethical principle of
informed consent (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). By broad-
ening the conception of what counts as evidence, this prob-
lem can be avoided for DCPIs. There are often evidentially
valid and cognitively simple ways to communicate e-trust-
worthiness and establish sound e-trust in such systems. In
this paper I hope to have convinced readers of the importance
and feasibility of providing such evidence.
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